Desperate times, desperate measures. In late January, the Adani stocks, which had previously defied gravity, began to plummet spectacularly after a fierce attack by US short seller Hindenburg Research. The group, led by then Asia's richest man Gautam Adani, was devastated. The flagship Adani Enterprises' FPO had to be cancelled, the cost of borrowing for the heavily indebted group soared, the stocks used as collateral for loans plummeted, and margin calls on loans were triggered. It seemed a financial death spiral was imminent. Something had to be done quickly to catch detractors off-guard and regain the confidence of the equity and bond markets, if only somewhat. With its back against the wall, the Adani group pulled a counter-intuitive rabbit out of its hat. Within a month, from early February to early March, it made two significant announcements regarding debt prepayments, totaling $2.15 billion. This was touted as a "complete" repayment of margin-linked share-backed loans taken by promoters. It is not entirely clear where the embattled promoters obtained the money to prepay, but the promoters' equity stake sales in Adani companies to GQG Partners may have helped. For now, the free fall seems to have paused. But, and there's always a but, something's amiss. Beat the street, a financial markets platform, uncover surprises from regulatory disclosures. If the loans have indeed been fully repaid, as claimed, why haven't the promoters and lenders disclosed the release of all pledged shares? This is a regulatory mandate. So, have the loans truly been paid off, or is there more to the story than meets the eye? Are there other anomalies as well?
